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The Golden Horde, Russia and the Ottoman Empire: the end of an era
Ema Miljkovic
(Nis University, Serbia) Ionut Cojocaru
(Lumina University, Bucharest)
Abstract: The mid-fourteenth century had brought the shift of power in the regions of Black and Caspian seas, as well as in Anatolia. The Mongol power had begun to diminish, thus leaving the space for emergence of new political and military powers in these regions: The Grand Principality of Moscow and the newly established Ottoman state (later the Ottoman Empire).
The reasons that contributed to the dissolution of the Mongol Kipchak Horde (The Golden Horde) were both internal and external ones: depopulation as a result of the emergence of the Black Death, dynastic crises, pressure of Tokhtamysh at the time ally of Timur Lenk and failure of centralization of the Horde.
The step further in the dissolution of the Golden Horde was the establishment of the Crimean Khanate in 1440 s. This event consequently matched the ruling period of the Ottoman sultan, Mehmed II (1451-1481), who had great ambitions, not only in the south-eastern Europe, but also in the Black Sea region. Strategic partnership of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire had become a huge threat both to the Black Sea Steppes and to the very important merchant cities of Kilia and Akkerman, under the control of the Genovese, settled on the Black Sea cost. This chain of events influenced also the position of Moldavia, who at the end began vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.
From the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Great Principality of Moscow also began its expansion toward the above mentioned regions, causing a whole range of Russian-Turkish wars led from 16th to the 18th century.
The Golden Horde, which was formed by Genghis Khan&s grandson Batu encompassed the territories of todays Russia and Ukraine, including the Crimean Peninsula in the south. In the centuries following Batu&s death, the Crimea became a haven for unsuccessful aspirants to the Horde&s throne [11, p. 2].
As described by Brian Davis, the author of the book «Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe 1500-1700»: By the 1420s, Crimea had broken away from the Kipchak Horde; by the 1440s, so had Kazans on the upper Volga. What had remained to to Kipchak klans was the lower Volga and the capital of Sarai. As they no longer controlled all the Tatar tribes of the Kipchak steppe, their domain was increasingly reffered to simply the Great Horde [2, p. 2].
By 1443, one of these contenders, Haci Giray, had succeeded in breaking away from the Golden Horde and establishing himself as independent ruler over parts of the Crimea and the adjacent areas of the steppe. His family was to rule over the Crimea with few exceptions until the end of the eighteenth century. That was, in reality, end of the Golden Horde [11, p. 2].
Islam great successes over Christianity, the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by Mehemed the Conqueror, occurred ten years after the establishment of the Khanate. That conquest attracted the attention of the Crimean Tatars who began to look to the Ottomans for assistance in their struggles with the Khans of the Golden Horde. Thus, in 1454 the Crimean Khanate became a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire [1, p. 108.; 6, p. 104-105].
One of the Sultan&s first actions upon gaining control of the entrance to the Black Sea, was to move against the Genoese trading colonies on the southern coast of the Crimea. In the summer of 1454, an Ottoman fleet of 56 vessels entered the Black Sea to begin the process of enforcing Mehemed II&s rule in an area that would eventually be known as the «Ottoman Lake» [1, p. 108-110; 3, p. 58-59].
Firstly, the Ottoman Army had conquered the city of Sevastopol. Then they tried to conquer Monocastro, later Akkeraman, but unsuccessfully. Haci Giray Khan led a troop of 6,000 Tatars to assist the Ottomans in an unsuccessful siege of Kaffa, on 11th July 1454. Although they did not succeed to conquer this important trading center, they made them paying the yearly tribute [6, p. 104; 1, p. 108].
In 1466, after the death of the Haci Giray, the civil war between his sons Nurudevlet and Mengeli had started. The important Tatar clan, the Shirins, had invited the Ottomans in 1475 to end the struggle for the throne in the Crimean Khanate. On their way to Crimea, the Ottoman troops started again the siege of Kaffa. Although the data varies, the Ottoman fleet consisted of 180 galleys, 3 vessels with three cataracts, 170 cargo vessels and 120 vessels for transportation of the horses [1, p. 31].
On the 1st July, the Ottoman fleet settled under the Kaffa walls (estimated population of the city at that time was 8.000 houses with 70.000 of inhabitants). The bombardment had begun on 2nd July. The resistance lasted only three days. On 6th July 1475, Kaffa surrendered to the Ottomans, who were again helped by the troops of Crimean throne candidate Mengeli Giray, who came under Kaffa with 1.500 of his horsemen. The commander of the Ottoman troops, Ahmed Pasha promised to keep the life of the population, on condition that they pay a tax named harac. All the foreigners that lived in Kaffa, Polishes, Vlachos, Russians, Georgians, Cherkessk had been deprived of their property, estimated to the 250.000 florins. On 12 and 13th July, all the youth of the city, both male and female had been gathered in front of the Ottomans, who took the best among them as the slaves for the Sultan&s palace (the estimation how many people had been taken varied from 1.500 up to 5.000). The Ottomans also made all Latin (Italian) citizens to leave the city and take them on their vessels to the unknown direction [1, p. 311-313].
The Ottoman Candidate, Mengeli Giray won the Crimean throne, which made stronger alliance between the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars. The Ottomans, not satisfied simply with the capture of Kaffa, continued their invasion of the Crimea&s southern coast eventually taking the Genoese cities of Inkerman, Sevastopol, Kerch, Balaklava, Sudak, and the strategic fortress of Azov on the Don Basin [11, p. 2-3].
The importance of the ports of Kaffa, Kilia and Akkerman were immense for the Ottoman trades. Those ports were the main link in the trade between the region of Mediterranean and the northern countries. Mainly, the goods sold in these ports were originally from Constantinople and Bursa, as well as from the southern Black Sea areas and
central Anatolia. For example, the famous silk from Amasya, the town on the Silk Trade Route leading from Iran was transferred from Sinop to Kaffa. This merchandise was very sought for, as it was also in use in the Ottoman court [5, p. 182].
Also, the cotton fabrics from Central Anatolia and the and the alimentary goods from the region of the Mediterranean, were among the goods exported, through Kaffa, to the Crimean Khanate, Poland, Grand Principality of Moscow and the Tatar lands on the territories of De§t-i Kip?ak and Volga basin. That route that had linked Constantinople with Kaffa was used also for transportation of European, but also Arabic and Indian merchandises [5, p. 181-182].
After completing the conquest, the southern coasts of the Crimea came under direct Ottoman rule and the Tatars found themselves sharing the peninsula with a new and extremely powerful neighbor, the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans were also successful in their efforts to influence the outcome of the war between Mengli Giray and Nurdevlet forces and, by 1478 they had placed their candidate, Mengli Giray, on the Crimean throne. In return for this assistance, Menegli promised Mehemed to «be the enemy of your enemy and friend of your friend». The Sultan was given various rights in the Crimea in return for his assistance, the most important being the right to confirm the Tatar clans& choice of Khan [2, p. 7-8].
The vassal relation between the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire had not always been always based upon the above mentioned principle.
For example, during the rule of the sultans Selim Yavuz (15121520) and Suleyman the Lawgiver (1520-1566), the Ottoman Empire had strictly controlled the foreign policy of the Crimean Khanate. However, in some other periods the Crimean Khanate led almost independent foreign policy, when the estimated that theeir sovereignty was endangered [2, p. 7-8].
The Crimean Khanate had never become the subject of the Sultan, as was, for example the position of Serbia or Bulgaria. Its position resembled at most the position of the Danube principalities, Vallachia and later Moldavia [6, p. 346-410].
According to Alan Fisher, author of the books «The Crimean Tatars» and «The Russian Annexation of Crime 1772-1783»: «Of all the
subjects of the Ottoman Sultans, the Crimean Khans held a special position because of importance of their genealogy» [4, p. 10].
After analyzing a series of correspondence from the Crimean court to Istanbul, Viktor Ostupchuk writes: «The uniqueness and significance of the Crimean letters to the Porte become particularly evident when they are compared with Crimean letters to non-Muslim States such as Muscovy, Poland, Transylvania, the Hapsburg Empire, Denmark, and others. The diplomatics of some of these correspondences has been analyzed in the past. With their resplendent tugras [royal seals] and lengthy intitulatios listing subject peoples of the Khan, these documents, which within their texts are often referred to as yarlig or royal command, state edict resemble missives of powerful and independent sovereigns. By contrast, contemporary letters to the [Ottoman] Porte, lack all the trappings of sovereignty, including the tugra and intitulatio, while the seal of the Khan is almost always relegated to the back of the document» [8, p. 256].
When Bayazit II (1481-1512) came to the Ottoman throne, he firstly secured peace with his main opponents, Venetia and Hungary. Then, he was at ease to direct the warpath against Moldavia, since that principality had made troubles to the Ottomans in Vallachia. The first attempt (in 1481) to conquer Moldavia was unsuccessful. Three years later, in 1484, Bayazit II, led himself the Ottoman troops in order to conquest important trade centers on the Black Sea, Kilia and Akkerman, which he had acquired in the same year. Those victories had opened the roads to Poland and Hungary, and strengthen the position of the sultan. The Ottomans had finally become the masters of the Black Sea [6, p. 128-129].
The Ottomans were troubled by the pretension of the Great Horde to the territory of the Crimean Khanate. That situation lasted until 1502, when the Ottomans had completely strengthened their position over the Crimea. That was also the time when Moscow started its pretension to the Black Sea basin [6, p. 117].
The rise of Russia in the 15th and the 16th century, made important territorial changes in certain territories. Grand Duke Ivan III (1462-1505) had conquered Novgorod (1478-1484), Tver (1478), destroyed the power of the Kazan Tatars in the basin of the Volga
River and made raids to Ukraine in order to capture Kiev (1503). His son Vasili III (1505-1533) had continued with the expansionistic politics of his father, which resulted in conquer of the towns of Pskov (1510), Ryzan (1521) and Smolensk (1533). He, thus, made Russia important European power [10, p. 137].
According to Brian Davies, during the time of reign of the Ottoman sultans Mehmed II (1451-1481), Bayazit II (1481-1512) and Selim I (1512-1520), the alliance established between the Crimean Tatars and the Grand Principality of Moscow against the Lithuanian-Poland coalition had been supported [2, p. 13]. Bayazit II had even given to the Muscovites the trade benefits in 1489 [5, p. 56].
The alliance between the Great Principality of Moscow and the Crimean Tatars (1470-1509) had enabled Ivan III to secure the territory of central Moscowy against the attacks of the Great Horde as well as to make possible for the Crimean Khan Mengeli Giray to conquer the Great Horde and extort the tribute from Poland and Lithuania [2, p. 13].
The alliance ended in 1509, with the ambition of the Crimean Khans to capture Moscow and Astrakhan. Although some of the first attacks were successful ones, the Tatars had failed to overthrow proMoscovite oriented Astrakhan khan, who was supported by the Nogais. Thus, the Crimean Tatars did not succeeded in their wish to complete the reunion of the Great Horde [2, p.14].
During the reign of the Ottoman sultan Selim Yavuz, both Moscowy and Crimea send their envoys to the Ottoman capital: the first to secure their economic and trade benefits with the Empire and the second trying to prevent the expansion of Moscowy to their territories. The coronation of Ivan the Terrible in 1547 was the signaled the immense danger to the khans of Crimea, Kazan and Astrakhan [3, 138-139].
The trade contacts between the Ottoman Empire and Russia had continued until 1552, when Ivan the Terrible had conquered the khanate of Kazan, situated on the Volga River. Four years later, in 1556 he had captured the khanate of Astrakhan, which was the first sign that Moscowy and Ottoman Empire did not share the common interests any more [3, p. 139]. Thus, Moscow had gained control of the entire basin of Volga [7, p. 11].
The more aggressive policy of the Ottoman Empire started from the sixties of the 16th century, especially during the vizierate of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, the Ottoman grand vizier from 1565-1579 [9, p. 329-331].
The Ottomans had the opportunity to give their attention to the north only after 1566, when the war with the Habsburg Empire seized to be the most important issue in the Grande Porte. Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had made a plan to build a canal between Don and Volga, in order to make free passage to the Ottoman fleet towards the Astrakhan [5, p. 57; 9, p. 330].
Astrakhan was of immense importance to the Ottomans, not only because they wanted to liberate their fellow Muslims of the Russian authority, but mainly because that would enable Ottoman fleet to enter the Caspian Sea as well, and to help the Ottoman army in Iran [5, p. 57].
Also, the Astrakhan khanate being in the Russian power meant for the Ottoman loosing the control over the route along which the Sunni Muslims pilgrims from Central Asia travelled on their way to one of the Black Sea Ports in order to travel to Mecca and connection with the Sunni Uzbeks [3, p. 139; 11, p. 15].
The control over the Astrakhan would mean, a for the Ottomans opening of the Silk Trade Route, leading between the East and West, as well [9, p. 329-330].
Sokollu Mehmed Pasha had many adversaries in the Constantinople itself, who thought that more attention should be paid to the region of Mediterranean, then to the Black Sea basin and the steppes of central Asia [9, p. 330].
According to some historians, the Crimean Khanate, vassal of the Ottomans, did nothing in order to help the Ottomans efforts toward the north. On the contrary they made obstacles during the attempt of building of the above mentioned canal. Thus, the siege of Astrakhan was unsuccessful [for example see: 9, p. 330-331].
Akdes Kurat also gave an interesting point of view regarding the same campaign: «The Turkish soldiers and horses died in their hundreds of hunger and thirst, and only a relatively small number arrived at Azak [Azov - E.M, C.I.C.] unscratched. By contrast losses were insignificant among the Crimean and Nogay Tatars who were inured to the hardships of this kind of march and avoided hunger and thirst by
eating the horse flesh and drinking mare&s milk» [quoted according to: 11, p. 16].
However, there are some completely different opinions. B.G. Williams noted that in the Astrakhan campaign «The Khan provided some 50,000 troops while the Ottomans supplied 15,000 for the expedition» [11, p. 15].
The same author presumes that this particular expedition would never been possible without the Crimean Tatars& and their Nogay vassals& aid. The Tatar had served as the guides and skirmishers, in order to protect the Ottoman troops from the raid of the Don Cossacks. [11, p. 15] Thus, he concluded that «An overview of the Crimean Tatars& assistance on the Russia front will demonstrate that it was only on this front that the Tatars were able to render their most valuable assistance to the Ottoman cause» [11, p. 19].
Despite all this, the Russian Tzar wanted to keep peace with the Ottomans. Sultan Selim II (1566-1574) had left Kazan and Astrakhan in the Russian hands, but he kept his suzerainty toward the Crimean Khanate, and also pledged his right to the lands of Cherkessk and Caucasus [5, p. 57].
But the Sultan did not lead his politics consistently, mainly because of the warfare in the Mediterranean. Although he wanted the route between the central Asia and Crimea opened, he did not put the pressure on the Russian Tzar for it [5, p. 58].
it it it
The fragile peace between the Ottoman Empire and Russia lasted until the forties of the 17th century. Since that time on those two Empires led severe wars, with three main goals: control of Azov, status of the Crimean Khanate and control of the Straits.
During the course of mid 17th and 18th century, Russia succeeded in her intentions. Azov, after several taking and retaking, had finally become Russian only in 1774, according to the provisions of the peace treaty of Ku^uk Kaynarca. Also, according the same treaty, Crimean Khanate became an independent state, but not for long. It was annexed by Russia in 1783. Also, according the provisions of the same peace treaty the Russians could have appointed the permanent ambassador in Constantinople, to build the Orthodox Church with the right of protection of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman capital and finally,
had gained the right for their trade fleet to flow without any restrictions both in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea [6, p. 325].
The aspiration of the Crimean Khanate toward the reunification of the territories of the Golden Horde had to be abandoned with the rise of the Russian power, but also with the Ottoman determination not to let the Crimean Tatars to lead their own foreign policy.
Thus, the Golden Horde cease to exist lost among the ambitions for territorial expansion of both Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The two powers reached the uncompromised peace only after the Lausanne conference and proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
REFERENCES
About the authors: Ema Miljkovic - Prof., Ph.D., Department of history, Faculty of Philosophy, Nis University (18000, Univerzitetski trg 2, Nis, Serbia); ema.miljkovic@filfak.ni.ac.rs
Ionut Cojocaru - Doc., Ph.D., Lumina University (021187, Soseaua Colentina 64b, Bucharest, Romania); c.i.cojocaru@gmail.com
Золотая Орда, Россия и
Османская Империя: конец эры
Эма Милкович
(Университет Ниш, Сербия)
Ионуц Кожокару
(Университет Лумина, Бухарест)
Аннотация: Середина XIV в. принесла смену власти в регионы Чёрного и Каспийского морей и в Анатолию. Власть монголов начала ослабевать, оставляя, таким образом, пространство для новых вторжений в эти регионы со стороны Великого Княжества Московского и Османского государства.
Причины, повлиявшие на распад Золотой Орды, были как внутренними, там и внешними: депопуляция, династические кризисы, давление Тохтамыша, который в то время был союзником Тимура и децентрализация в Орде.
Дальнейшим шагом распада Золотой Орды послужило возникновение Крымского Ханства в 1440 году. Это событие, соответственно, совпало с периодом правления османского султана Мехмеда II (14511481), у которого были огромные амбиции не только в Юго-Восточной Европе, но также и в регионе Чёрного моря. Стратегическое партнёрство Крымского Ханства и Османской Империи стало огромной угрозой Степям Причерноморья, а также самым важным торговым городам Ки-лия, Аккерман, находившихся под контролем генуэзцев, поселившихся на побережье Чёрного моря. Эта цепь событий повлияла также и на Молдавию, которая в итоге стала вассальным государством Османской Империи.
С начала шестнадцатого века Великое Княжество Московское тоже начало свою экспансию в вышеупомянутом регионе, став причиной ряда русско-турецких войн, которые длились с XVI по XVIII века.
Сведения об авторах: Эма Милкович - профессор, Ph.D., кафедра истории, факультет философии, Университет Ниш (18000, Университетская ул., 2, Ниш, Сербия); ema.miljkovic@filfak.ni.ac.rs
Ионуц Кожокару - доцент, Ph.D., Университет Лумина (021187, Шоссе Колентина, 64b, Бухарест, Румыния); c.i.cojocaru@gmail.com
